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Abstract. We investigate if capital account openness has played a major role in the evolution 
of global imbalances on the period 1980-2003. We estimate, with panel regression techniques, 
the impact of capital account openness on medium run current account imbalances for 
industrialized and emerging countries by using a de jure measure of capital account openness 
(the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness, 2002, 2006) and a de facto measure of 
capital account openness (the gross foreign assets measured as the sum of foreign assets and 
foreign liabilities). By increasing the opportunities of overseas investments, the relative 
capital account openness has had positive impact on medium run current account balances of 
industrialized countries (because of downward pressures on domestic investment rates). 
Conversely, the relative capital account openness has had negative impact on medium run 
current account balances of emerging countries (because of upward pressures on domestic 
investment rates). The evolutions of domestic and foreign capital account openness have 
allowed increasing medium run current account balances in absolute value during this period. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Current account imbalances have grown significantly the last fifteen years. Several factors 
have been designated, in the literature, as the main drivers of these imbalances: growth 
differentials, saving and investment rate differences, exchange rate misalignments and 
financial openness (i.e. capital account openness). 
 
Since the middle of the 1990’s, global imbalances intensify to reach a climax before the 
financial crisis in 2006-08. These evolutions can be considered as unsustainable and they have 
been one of the underlying causes of the financial crisis2. In 2006, the main contributors of 
these imbalances are the United States (with a deficit of more than 1.6 percent of world 
GDP), China and Asian countries and the oil exporters’ countries (with a joint surplus of 
more than 1.8 percent of world GDP) as shown in figure 1. 
 
Global imbalances are a threat to the global macroeconomic stability. Therefore identify the 
main causes and drivers of these imbalances seem to be crucial. We estimate, with panel 
regression techniques, the impact of capital account openness on medium run current account 
imbalances for industrialized and emerging countries by using a de jure measure of capital 
account openness (the Chinn-Ito index of capital account openness, 2002, 2006) and a de 
facto measure of capital account openness (the gross foreign assets measured as the sum of 
foreign assets and foreign liabilities). The main finding is that the relative capital account 
openness (measured relatively to world average) has played significant role on the magnitude 
of medium run current account. By increasing the opportunities of overseas investments, the 
relative financial openness has had positive impact on medium run current account balances 
of industrialized countries (because of downward pressures on domestic investment rates). 
Conversely, the relative financial openness has had negative impact on medium run current 
account balances of emerging countries (because of upward pressures on domestic investment 
rates). 
 
For a number of industrialized countries, the evolution of the relative financial openness 
(which has dropped since the middle of the 1980’s since they have already liberalized their 
capital account and that the world average has followed an increasing trend) has had a 
negative impact on medium run current account balances. For South-East Asian countries, 
the evolution of the relative financial openness (which has dropped since the middle of the 
1980’s since these countries have liberalized their capital account more slowly than the world 
average) has had a positive impact on medium run current account balances. 
                                         
2 Servén and Nguyen (2010) examine the different views on the role of the global imbalances before 
and after the crisis. 
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This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 presents various approaches which have been 
proposed to shed light on the development of global imbalances since the mid-1990’s. Section 
3 provides empirical results of the current account regressions. Section 4 studies in greater 
details the contributions of each explanatory variable to the medium run current account. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
Figure 1: Current account balances as percent of world GDP 
 
(Source: World Economic Outlook, October 2010, International Monetary Fund, forecast after 2009, author’s calculations) 
2. Various explanatory approaches of global imbalances 
 
Various explanations have been proposed to explain the surge of global imbalances observed 
since the middle of the 1990’s among them we find the Saving-Investment approach, the 
intertemporal approach, the Global Saving Glut hypothesis, Bretton-Woods II and East 
Asian Mercantilism versus Self-protection3. 
 
 The Saving-Investment approach 
 
From the point of view of the national account identity, the external sector balance (the 
current account balance) can be seen as the sum of the public sector balance and the private 
sector balance: 
                                         
3 Chinn (2010) provides a large survey on these different approaches and the corresponding empirical 
findings. 
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Y+M C+I+G+X          [1] 
 
If we introduce the public receipts net of transfer payments in the equation [1], we obtained 
this new relationship (equation [2]): 
 
   CA T -G + S -I          [2] 
 
With Y, gross domestic product; C, private consumption; I, private investment; G, 
government spending; X, Exports; M, Imports; [S  I], private sector saving-investment 
balance, CA, current account balance. 
 
The issues surrounding global imbalances can be analyzed as imbalances in domestic saving 
rates and domestic investment rates in the main economic areas at world scale. These 
imbalances could have been accentuated by financial openness (i.e. openness of the capital 
account) which has increased on the 1980-2003 period at the world level. 
 
 The Intertemporal approach 
 
The intertemporal approach is based on the behavior of rational expectation agent which 
maximizes utility function under a budget constraint. They smooth consumption by 
borrowing and saving thus current consumption is equal to a discounted value of future 
expected net output or net wealth. Change in expectations about future growth caused by 
productivity shocks or reductions in investment and government spending induces change in 
consumption. 
 
In this perspective, the huge deficits observed in the U.S. during the 2000’s could be 
interpreted as an expectation of a productivity boom which will improve future growth 
significantly. This view could be more attractive if the GDP growth has been driven by 
investment rather than by consumption during this period. It seems that the profit motive 
was not the main reason behind the huge incoming flows in the U. S. 
 
 The Global Saving Glut hypothesis 
 
Introduced by Bernanke (2005), Clarida (2005a, b), the “global saving glut” hypothesis 
explain the surge of U.S. deficit during the 2000’s by a financial underdevelopment of Asian 
emerging countries. These differences in financial development and financial openness have 
allowed Asian emerging countries to export their excess of saving (due to rising savings and 
dropping investments after the 1997 crisis) to the U.S. Following the oil price evolutions, the 
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oil exporter has become an important provider of savings to international financial markets. 
In this view, the U.S. external imbalance is a problem made overseas. The solution is to 
develop financial system of emerging market with excess saving in order to reduce the 
financial flow to countries with better financial system. 
 
 Bretton-Woods II and East Asian Mercantilism versus Self-protection 
 
The East Asian surpluses can be attributed to mercantilist behavior as an outcome of this 
concerted effort, the U.S. run large external have surged. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and 
Graber (2003, 2008) argue that financing of America’s trade deficit is an explicit quid pro 
quo to continued access to American markets. The accumulation of large amount of reserve 
can be explained by a precautionary demand or self-insurance against volatility of capital 
flows and macroeconomic consequences of sudden drop for instance and notably after the 
East-Asian crisis of 1997. 
 
3. Empirical results 
 
As the current account equals the difference between domestic saving and investment (i.e. 
the saving-investment balance), the current account developments are examined from the 
perspective of the medium and long run determinants of saving and investment behaviors 
(Faruqee and Debelle, 1998, Chinn and Prasad, 2003). According to these authors, the main 
determinants of the current account at medium term are, inter alia, the demographic 
characteristics, such as, the dependency ratios of dependent populations relative to the 
working age population or the population growth, which is expected to exert a negative 
influence, with a higher dependency ratio leading to more spending; the government budget 
balance, with a public deficit having a negative effect on the current account, but this effect 
may be regarded as a simple accounting one which has not to be introduced4. 
 
The equations of current account are estimated with panel data for 1980-2003 period and for 
two groups of countries. In a medium term perspective, we use non-overlapping four years 
average of annual data (Lee et al., 2008)5. 
 
                                         
4 There are other variables, such as the openness ratio, which plays negatively, a higher openness 
meaning a greater possibility of assuring the debt service in the future, or the relative real GDP per 
capita, which exerts a non-linear influence according to stages of development. The results were not 
significant enough. Moreover, relative GDP per capita is evaluated non stationary by most of tests. 
5 We introduce a panel GMM panel estimator in order to cope with eventual problems of endogeneity. 
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i,t i,t i,tCA =S -I           [3] 
 
i,t i t 0 1 i,t 2 i,t 3 i,t i,t i t4 ,RPG ROGCA  =  +   +   +   +   +   +RKAOPEN R A  +  GF  [4] 
 
The variables of equation [4] are defined as follows: CA, current account as % of GDP; RPG, 
relative population growth (relative to the weighted world average), as percent of the total 
population; ROG, relative output gap (relative to the weighted world average) expressed as 
the percentage difference between actual GDP in constant prices, and estimated potential 
GDP; RKAOPEN, relative financial openness (relative to the weighted world average) based 
on the Chinn-Ito index; RGFA, relative gross foreign assets (relative to the weighted world 
average) in % of GDP measured as the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities. The 
sources of the different variables are presented in appendix 1. 
 
One group is composed of 18 industrial countries (Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States). The other group, 
composed of 21 emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Egypt, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey). 
 
In the current account regressions for industrialized country group (table 1), the coefficients 
are significant and have the expected signs: the increase of the relative population growth 
(RPG) reduces the current account balance (because of a higher proportion of dependent 
population), the increase of the relative output gap (ROG) deteriorates the current account 
(via the induced imports caused by the increase of the output gap of the country relatively to 
world average). For industrialized countries, an increase of relative financial openness 
(RKAOPEN or RGFA) allows to make investment abroad more extensively. Consequently, 
there is a downward pressure on the domestic investment rate and so, this evolution have a 
positive impact on the current account6. 
 
The sign of this coefficient express the impact of a variation financial openness on the current 
account balance. This kind of relationship is connected with the extensive litterature on the 
capital account openness and economic growth nexus. If financial openness enhance growth 
then the current account deteriorates because of an increase of induced imports. 
                                         
6 In order to check this point, we replace in the regressions the current account balance by the 
domestic investment rate (see appendix 1 for the source of the data). We find that financial openness 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on the domestic investment rate for the 
industrialized countries group. 
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However, the survey works on this issue by Eichengreen (2001) and by Kose et al. (2006) 
reports that the litterature failed to provide a robust and systematic (positive) evidence 
between growth and capital account openness. 
 
As an illustration of this last point, two recent empirical studies (Carmignani, 2008, Quinn 
and Toyoda, 2008) found different results on this issue. Carmignani (2008) argues (thanks to 
a system estimation and a de jure measure of financial openness) that capital account 
openness stimulated growth through trade openness and financial development and that the 
direct effect of capital account on growth is negligeable. Quinn and Toyoda (2008) found 
empirical evidence of positive link between capital account openness and growth by using a 
de jure measure of capital account openness. 
 
Table 1: Determinants of the current account for industrialized countries 
 
 OLS Pooled 
OLS Individual 
Fixed Effects 
OLS Time 
Fixed Effects 
Constant 
-2.54*** 
(0.09) 
-1.43*** 
(0.21) 
-2.45*** 
(0.37) 
RPG 
-3.00*** 
(0.28) 
-1.20** 
(0.51) 
-3.03*** 
(0.61) 
ROG 
-0.37* 
(0.19) 
-0.48*** 
(0.12) 
-0.39*** 
(0.14) 
RKAOPEN 
1.08*** 
(0.15) 
0.92*** 
(0.10) 
0.92*** 
(0.25) 
Adjusted R squared 0.40 0.77 0.36 
Number of 
Observations 
108 108 108 
Hausman test statistic  
2.60 
[0.45] 
 
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The last row shows 
Hausman test statistics for random effects versus fixed effects specifications. P-values are reported in square 
brackets. Source: author’s estimates. 
 
Ordinary least square (OLS) specifications with individual fixed effects raise the coefficient of 
determination. The generalized method of moments panel estimator (Arellano and Bond, 
1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995) shows that there is no problem of endogeneity for the chosen 
specification in the current account regressions for industrialized countries group (appendix 
2). 
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For a number of industrialized countries, the RKAOPEN variable follows a negative trend 
since the beginning of the 1980’s. The RKAOPEN variable describes the magnitude of 
financial openness relative to global average of financial openness (which corresponds to a 
weighted average7 of the KAOPEN index (Chinn & Ito, 2002, 2006). 
 
Table 2: Panel unit root tests for industrialized countries 
 
Variables CA RPG ROG RKAOPEN RGFA 
Industrialized countries group 
-11.01*** 
[0.00] 
-19.49*** 
[0.00] 
-51.20*** 
[0.00] 
-28.83*** 
[0.00] 
-2.50*** 
[0.00] 
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively, using the test statistic Im Pesaran Shin; the rejection of the null hypothesis (of the presence of 
unit root), leads to reject non-stationarity of the series. P-values are reported in square brackets. Source: author’s 
calculations. 
 
Since the global average follows a positive trend since the middle of the 1980’s and that 
many industrialized countries have already liberalized their capital account in early 1980’s, 
the relative capital openness variable (RKAOPEN) dropped in these countries. These 
evolutions have contributed negatively to the current account since the estimated coefficient 
is positive and statistically significant for the industrialized countries’ panel in all regressions 
(see appendix 3, for the linear correlation between current account and RKAOPEN). 
 
In order to check the consistency of the results, we introduce an alternative measure of 
financial openness (RGFA) which corresponds to the sum of the foreign assets and foreign 
liabilities of the country relatively to world average in % of GDP. The coefficient of the 
RGFA variable8 is positive and statistically significant for the industrialized country like in 
regression with the RKAOPEN variable. This is reassuring about the robustness of the 
results (see appendix 4). 
                                         
7 The weights are equals to the share of each country in world GDP in dollar PPP terms. More 
precisely, the more the KAOPEN index is high, the more the country is open to cross-border capital 
transactions. In order to avoid the complexity of interpreting the estimated coefficients, this variable 
(KAOPEN) is adjusted such that the minimum value is zero, i.e., they range between zero and some 
positive value. The demeaning of the series allows controlling for rest of the world effects (Chinn & 
Ito, 2007). 
8 The RGFA variable is not stationary in level so we use the variation, to avoid fallacious regressions’ 
problems, of this variable but the interpretation remains basically the same than for the RKAOPEN 
variable. 
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Table 3: Determinants of the current account for emerging countries 
 
 OLS Pooled 
OLS Individual  
Fixed Effects 
OLS Time  
Fixed Effects 
Constant 
-0.97** 
(0.40) 
-0.30 
(0.50) 
-1.19** 
(0.52) 
RPG 
-1.94*** 
(0.36) 
-3.21*** 
(0.41) 
-1.66*** 
(0.43) 
ROG 
-0.44*** 
(0.06) 
-0.35*** 
(0.06) 
-0.33*** 
(0.10) 
RKAOPEN 
-0.47** 
(0.17) 
-0.63** 
(0.23) 
-0.45* 
(0.18) 
Adjusted R squared 0.47 0.68 0.35 
Number of 
Observations 
126 126 126 
Hausman test statistic  
9.51** 
[0.02] 
 
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The last row shows 
Hausman test statistics for random effects versus fixed effects specifications. P-values are reported in square 
brackets. Source: author’s estimates. 
 
Table 4: Panel unit root tests for emerging countries 
 
Variables CA RPG ROG RKAOPEN RGFA 
Emerging countries group 
-5.88*** 
[0.00] 
-6.19*** 
[0.00] 
-27.17*** 
[0.00] 
-4.74*** 
[0.00] 
-4.74*** 
[0.00] 
Notes: The symbols *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 
levels, respectively, using the test statistic Im Pesaran Shin; the rejection of the null hypothesis (of the presence of 
unit root), leads to reject non-stationarity of the series. P-values are reported in square brackets. Source: author’s 
calculations. 
 
The results of unit root tests are presented in table 2 and 4. As it can be seen, the null 
hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected in all the series. 
 
In the current account regressions for emerging country group (table 3), the coefficients are 
significant and have the expected signs. Once again, OLS specifications with individual fixed 
effects raise the coefficient of determination. GMM panel estimator shows that there is no 
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problem of endogeneity for the chosen specification in the current account regressions 
(appendix 2). The main difference with the current account regression for industrialized 
countries group is the sign of the coefficient of the RKAOPEN variable which is negative for 
emerging countries group (see appendix 3 for the linear correlation between current account 
and RKAOPEN). 
 
For emerging countries, an increase of relative financial openness (RKAOPEN or RGFA) 
allows to receive investments from abroad more extensively. Consequently, there is an 
upward pressure on the domestic investment rate9 and so, this evolution have a negative 
impact on the current account (Ito & Chinn, 2007). 
 
Once again, the de facto measure of financial openness (RGFA) is statistically significant and 
has the same sign (i.e. negative) than that of the RKAOPEN variable for the emerging 
countries group (see appendix 4). 
 
For a number of emerging countries, the RKAOPEN variable follows a negative trend since 
the beginning of the 1980’s. The RKAOPEN variable describes the magnitude of financial 
openness relative to global average of financial openness (which corresponds to a weighted 
average10 of the KAOPEN index (Chinn & Ito, 2002, 2006)). 
 
For these countries, the drop of the relative capital openness (RKAOPEN) variable means 
that they liberalized their capital account more slowly than the global average. These 
evolutions have contributed positively to the current account since the estimated coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant for the emerging countries’ panel in all regressions. 
  
                                         
9 In order to check this point, we replace in the regressions the current account balance by the 
domestic investment rate (see appendix 1 for the source of the data). We find that financial openness 
has a positive and statistically significant impact on the domestic investment rate for the 
emerging countries group. 
10 See note 4. 
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4. Contributions to the medium run current account balances 
 
As it been explained in the previous section, the drop of the RKAOPEN variable has induced 
an increase of the medium run deficit in a number of industrialized countries and an increase 
of the medium run surplus of South-East Asia’s emerging countries. This section illustrates 
this point by studying some striking cases. 
 
 The United States and the United Kingdom 
 
The case of the United Stated (table 5 to 10) is very interesting because it illustrates very 
well the case of countries which have totally liberalized its capital account in the early 1980’s 
(thus the KAOPEN index, which is an inverse measure of capital controls, reached its upper 
limit). In addition, the global average of financial openness had increase on the 1980-2003’s 
period (see appendix 5). These two evolutions have induced a drop of the RKAOPEN 
variable for the United States. The medium run current account11, which was around - 1.7 % 
at the beginning of the 1980’s, have reached around - 2.5 % at the beginning of the 2000’s. In 
this evolution, the relative financial openness has played a negative role. In fact, the 
contribution of the RKAOPEN variable was near from 1.3 % in the beginning of the period 
was reduced to only 0.9 % because the domestic and foreign evolution of the financial 
openness which have been already describe and because of positive coefficients of the 
RKAOPEN variable in the current account regressions for industrialized countries. 
 
The case of the United Kingdom (table 5 to 10) is very similar to that of the United States, 
in a smaller scale. However, the capital account was totally liberalized only at the middle of 
the 1980’s. The medium run current account have dropped to -1.7 % at the end of the period 
whereas it was equal to - 1 % in 1980. Once again the reduction of the relative capital 
openness (the RKAOPEN variable) has played a negative role in the evolution of the 
medium run current account from the middle of the 1980’s to the end of the period. 
 
 South-East Asian countries and India 
 
For South-East Asian’s emerging countries, the story is completely different. These countries 
have also seen the RKAOPEN variable decrease but for different reasons of those of the 
United States or the United Kingdom. The main explanation of this drop is that, globally, 
                                         
11 We use the OLS individual fixed effects specification to calculate the medium-term current account 
(i.e. equilibrium current account) for all the countries. In order to capture medium to long run trends, 
we set the output gaps at zero. 
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East Asian’s emerging countries have opened they capital account more slowly than the 
world average (see appendix 5). For China (table 5 to 10), the medium-term current account 
have grown significantly from the beginning of the period (from 1% in 1980 to 2.5% in 2003) 
in this evolution the reduction of the relative population growth and the stability of the 
financial openness have played a positive role12. 
 
The cases of Malaysia and Indonesia (table 5 to 10) are similar on several points. They have 
increased their medium run current account since the beginning of the 1980’s (from around -
2% in 1980 to 1 % in 2003 for Indonesia; from 0% to 2% for Malaysia). In these evolutions 
the reduction of the relative population growth and the drop of the relative financial 
openness (due to the fact that these countries have liberalized their capital account more 
slowly than the world average) have played a positive role. 
 
The medium run current accounts of Thailand and the Philippines have different profiles 
(table 5 to 10) but, in these two countries, the stability of the relative financial openness has 
had a positive impact on the underlying capital flows, on the whole period. The medium run 
current account, which was very negative in the beginning of the sample (-4% for Thailand 
and -2.5 % for the Philippines), have progressively improved to reach 0 % in Thailand and -
2% in the Philippines. In this evolution, the depletion of the population growth has played a 
positive role. 
 
The evolution of the relative financial openness in the South-East Asian’s emerging countries 
reflect the fact these countries have liberalized their capital account more slowly than the 
world average. This relative decrease has had a positive impact on the current for these 
countries since the coefficient associated to the RKAOPEN variable is negative for the 
emerging countries group. 
 
The evolutions of the medium run current account of India and its contributions (table 5 to 
10) can be compared to those of South-East Asian’s emerging countries. Insofar the medium 
run current account has improved steadily during the whole period (from around -2% to 
around 0%). In addition, the stability of relative financial openness has contributed positively 
(about 1%) to the medium run current account and the reduction of the dependency ratio 
has also had a positive impact but to a lesser extent than small South-East Asian countries 
                                         
12 It seems to be important to recall that the signs of the coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant for the RKAOPEN variable in all current account regression of the emerging countries 
group. 
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which are submitted to weaker demographic constrained (comparatively to demographic 
giants like China and India13). 
 
 Latin American countries 
 
The case of Latin American countries is more dispersed than those of South-East Asian 
countries on the 1980-2003’s period. For Brazil (table 5 to 10), the evolution of the relative 
financial openness has had a positive impact until the end of the 2000’s. At the beginning of 
the 2000, Brazil opened his capital account more rapidly (see appendix 5) and this evolution 
induced a drop in the positive contribution of relative financial openness observed earlier. In 
spite of this decreasing evolution of financial openness, the reduction of the population 
growth has had a positive impact on the medium run current account which has slowly 
improved (from -4% to -2%). 
 
The case of Mexico (table 5 to 10) can be seen as the opposite of South-East Asian’s 
emerging countries cases. Indeed, Mexico had strongly reduced its relative capital openness 
(see appendix 5) after the debt crisis. The RKAOPEN variable decreased until 1986 and after 
that the openness index increased steadily until the beginning of the 2000’s. This evolution of 
relative financial openness has contributed negatively to the medium run current account 
from the middle of the 1980’s to the beginning of the 2000’s. In spite of this negative 
contribution of financial openness, the medium run current account has improved strongly 
(from around -4% to around 0%) mainly thanks to favorable demographic evolution. 
 
Argentina is the country in which the medium-term current account has known the most 
contrasted movements (table 5 to 10) mainly due to large variation in the relative financial 
openness. The medium run current account has improved on the whole period (from -1.5% to 
-0.5%) but with large variations notably during the period of the currency board system. At 
the beginning of the currency board scheme, the relative financial openness has been more 
pronounced and, thus, the contribution of the RKAOPEN variable which has been positive 
(around 1%) in 1988-1991, became negative (around -0.3%) in 1996-1999. This evolution of 
the relative financial openness has participated to accentuate the current account deficit 
during the currency board era. After the burst of the crisis in 2001, the medium run current 
account became less negative (about -0.5%). 
 
                                         
13 In spite of similar demographic profiles, China and India have had different policy of fertility. The 
‘one-child policy’ has allowed an impressive reduction of the population growth and dependency ratios 
in China. 
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For Chile, the medium run current account remains stable to around -4% (table 5 to 10). 
The relative financial openness is relatively stable and contributed positively to the medium 
term current account until the beginning of the 2000’s. At this moment, Chile has opened its 
capital account more rapidly14 and so the contribution to the medium run current account of 
the RKAOPEN variable decreased sharply. 
 
For Colombia, the medium-term current account has steadily improved from -2% to -1% on 
the whole period (table 5 to 10). The stability of the relative financial openness has 
contributed positively (like in the case of South-East Asian’s emerging countries) to the 
medium run current account. An impressive reduction of the relative population growth has, 
also, contributed to the medium run current account progression. 
 
  
                                         
14 Interestingly, Brazil and Chile have opened more rapidly their capital account at the beginning of 
the 2000’s whereas Argentina has known the inverse evolution. 
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Table 5: Contribution to the medium run current account on the 1980-1983 period (in % of GDP) 
 
 
Actual 
current 
account 
Medium run 
current 
account 
Population 
Growth 
Kaopen Intercept 
Individual 
fixed effect 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Industrial 
      
United States -0.26 -1.77 0.06 1.33 -1.44 -1.73 
Japan 0.45 2.07 0.34 0.96 -1.44 2.20 
Germany -0.28 0.94 1.20 1.33 -1.44 -0.16 
France -1.09 -0.60 0.59 -1.34 -1.44 1.59 
United Kingdom 0.96 -1.08 1.17 0.96 -1.44 -1.76 
Italy -2.38 -2.14 1.08 -1.90 -1.44 0.11 
Canada -1.65 -1.39 -0.22 1.33 -1.44 -1.07 
Developing 
      
China 1.06 0.79 -1.16 1.74 -0.30 0.52 
Brazil -6.65 -3.64 -4.23 1.84 -0.30 -0.95 
India -1.54 -1.91 -3.88 1.41 -0.30 0.86 
Mexico -2.64 -4.21 -4.26 0.17 -0.30 0.20 
Korea -4.97 -1.05 -1.71 1.08 -0.30 -0.12 
Indonesia -2.31 -1.96 -3.54 -0.51 -0.30 2.39 
Argentina -2.60 -1.62 -1.64 1.08 -0.30 -0.75 
Thailand -5.92 -3.48 -2.46 0.75 -0.30 -1.47 
Colombia -3.72 -2.40 -3.82 1.84 -0.30 -0.12 
Malaysia -8.89 -0.33 -4.79 -0.51 -0.30 5.28 
Chile -8.99 -4.14 -1.70 1.30 -0.30 -3.44 
Philippines -5.51 -2.49 -4.80 1.41 -0.30 1.21 
Note: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Source: author’s calculations. 
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Table 6: Contribution to the medium run current account on the 1984-1987 period (in % of GDP) 
 
 
Actual 
current 
account 
Medium run 
current 
account 
Population 
Growth 
Kaopen Intercept 
Individual 
fixed effect 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Industrial 
      
United States -2.97 -1.88 0.03 1.26 -1.44 -1.73 
Japan 3.58 2.43 0.40 1.26 -1.44 2.20 
Germany 3.05 0.88 1.22 1.26 -1.44 -0.16 
France -0.10 -0.40 0.62 -1.17 -1.44 1.59 
United Kingdom -0.80 -1.09 0.86 1.26 -1.44 -1.76 
Italy -0.54 -1.41 1.09 -1.17 -1.44 0.11 
Canada -2.05 -1.41 -0.16 1.26 -1.44 -1.07 
Developing 
      
China -1.37 0.10 -1.68 1.57 -0.30 0.52 
Brazil -0.61 -3.11 -3.75 1.90 -0.30 -0.95 
India -1.75 -1.81 -3.83 1.46 -0.30 0.86 
Mexico 1.13 -2.18 -3.67 1.60 -0.30 0.20 
Korea 2.30 0.71 -0.33 1.46 -0.30 -0.12 
Indonesia -2.93 -1.97 -3.20 -0.86 -0.30 2.39 
Argentina -2.45 -1.43 -1.84 1.46 -0.30 -0.75 
Thailand -2.29 -2.72 -1.75 0.80 -0.30 -1.47 
Colombia -1.64 -2.23 -3.70 1.90 -0.30 -0.12 
Malaysia 0.25 -1.95 -6.07 -0.86 -0.30 5.28 
Chile -7.45 -4.22 -2.38 1.90 -0.30 -3.44 
Philippines 1.46 -2.59 -4.79 1.30 -0.30 1.21 
Note: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Source: author’s calculations. 
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Table 7: Contribution to the medium run current account on the 1988-1991 period (in % of GDP) 
 
 
Actual 
current 
account 
Medium run 
current 
account 
Population 
Growth 
Kaopen Intercept 
Individual 
fixed effect 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Industrial 
      
United States -1.38 -2.05 -0.09 1.20 -1.44 -1.73 
Japan 2.07 2.74 0.77 1.20 -1.44 2.20 
Germany 2.57 -0.01 0.39 1.20 -1.44 -0.16 
France -0.55 -0.39 0.49 -1.04 -1.44 1.59 
United Kingdom -3.63 -1.11 0.89 1.20 -1.44 -1.76 
Italy -1.76 -1.23 1.13 -1.04 -1.44 0.11 
Canada -3.51 -1.88 -0.57 1.20 -1.44 -1.07 
Developing 
      
China 1.10 0.58 -1.56 1.94 -0.30 0.52 
Brazil 0.08 -1.74 -2.42 1.94 -0.30 -0.95 
India -2.29 -1.26 -3.32 1.50 -0.30 0.86 
Mexico -2.85 -1.84 -2.89 1.16 -0.30 0.20 
Korea 1.64 0.45 0.03 0.84 -0.30 -0.12 
Indonesia -2.34 -0.93 -2.20 -0.82 -0.30 2.39 
Argentina 0.80 -0.88 -1.33 1.50 -0.30 -0.75 
Thailand -5.49 -1.72 -0.79 0.84 -0.30 -1.47 
Colombia 1.14 -1.74 -3.03 1.72 -0.30 -0.12 
Malaysia -1.20 -1.70 -5.86 -0.82 -0.30 5.28 
Chile -1.29 -4.19 -2.38 1.94 -0.30 -3.44 
Philippines -2.69 -1.97 -4.38 1.50 -0.30 1.21 
Note: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Source: author’s calculations. 
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Table 8: Contribution to the medium run current account on the 1992-1995 period (in % of GDP) 
 
 
Actual 
current 
account 
Medium run 
current 
account 
Population 
Growth 
Kaopen Intercept 
Individual 
fixed effect 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Industrial 
      
United States -1.33 -2.59 -0.35 0.92 -1.44 -1.73 
Japan 2.72 2.46 0.83 0.86 -1.44 2.20 
Germany -1.16 -0.09 0.59 0.92 -1.44 -0.16 
France 0.50 1.33 0.74 0.44 -1.44 1.59 
United Kingdom -1.55 -1.39 0.88 0.92 -1.44 -1.76 
Italy 0.46 0.27 1.15 0.44 -1.44 0.11 
Canada -2.63 -1.63 -0.05 0.92 -1.44 -1.07 
Developing 
      
China 0.24 1.50 -0.51 1.80 -0.30 0.52 
Brazil -0.34 -0.88 -1.75 2.13 -0.30 -0.95 
India -0.97 -0.44 -2.69 1.69 -0.30 0.86 
Mexico -4.73 -2.31 -2.63 0.43 -0.30 0.20 
Korea -0.91 0.47 -0.14 1.03 -0.30 -0.12 
Indonesia -1.98 -0.22 -1.68 -0.63 -0.30 2.39 
Argentina -3.12 -1.80 -1.08 0.33 -0.30 -0.75 
Thailand -5.95 -1.24 -0.50 1.03 -0.30 -1.47 
Colombia -2.53 -1.14 -2.73 2.02 -0.30 -0.12 
Malaysia -6.31 -0.07 -5.02 -0.03 -0.30 5.28 
Chile -3.07 -4.45 -2.46 1.76 -0.30 -3.44 
Philippines -3.61 -2.45 -4.07 0.72 -0.30 1.21 
Note: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Source: author’s calculations. 
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Table 9: Contribution to the medium run current account on the 1996-1999 period (in % of GDP) 
 
 
Actual 
current 
account 
Medium run 
current 
account 
Population 
Growth 
Kaopen Intercept 
Individual 
fixed effect 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Industrial 
      
United States -2.24 -2.57 -0.32 0.92 -1.44 -1.73 
Japan 2.34 2.24 0.80 0.67 -1.44 2.20 
Germany -0.76 0.25 0.93 0.92 -1.44 -0.16 
France 2.41 1.76 0.69 0.92 -1.44 1.59 
United Kingdom -0.91 -1.53 0.75 0.92 -1.44 -1.76 
Italy 2.08 0.65 1.05 0.92 -1.44 0.11 
Canada -0.43 -1.65 -0.07 0.92 -1.44 -1.07 
Developing 
      
China 2.31 1.61 -0.29 1.69 -0.30 0.52 
Brazil -3.64 -1.27 -1.93 1.91 -0.30 -0.95 
India -1.20 -0.42 -2.67 1.69 -0.30 0.86 
Mexico -2.16 -1.64 -1.76 0.23 -0.30 0.20 
Korea 2.84 1.50 0.23 1.69 -0.30 -0.12 
Indonesia 0.75 0.40 -1.59 -0.09 -0.30 2.39 
Argentina -3.91 -2.21 -0.86 -0.29 -0.30 -0.75 
Thailand 3.25 -1.35 -0.61 1.03 -0.30 -1.47 
Colombia -3.18 -1.40 -2.67 1.69 -0.30 -0.12 
Malaysia 4.62 0.46 -5.12 0.60 -0.30 5.28 
Chile -3.32 -3.32 -1.59 2.02 -0.30 -3.44 
Philippines -2.81 -2.10 -3.89 0.89 -0.30 1.21 
Note: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Source: author’s calculations. 
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Table 10: Contribution to the medium run current account on the 2000-2003 period (in % of GDP) 
 
 
Actual 
current 
account 
Medium run 
current 
account 
Population 
Growth 
Kaopen Intercept 
Individual 
fixed effect 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Industrial 
      
United States -4.30 -2.45 -0.21 0.92 -1.44 -1.73 
Japan 2.70 2.47 0.78 0.92 -1.44 2.20 
Germany 0.59 0.20 0.87 0.92 -1.44 -0.16 
France 1.44 1.33 0.26 0.92 -1.44 1.59 
United Kingdom -2.01 -1.69 0.58 0.92 -1.44 -1.76 
Italy -0.67 0.28 0.68 0.92 -1.44 0.11 
Canada 1.98 -1.64 -0.06 0.92 -1.44 -1.07 
Developing 
      
China 2.06 2.48 0.57 1.69 -0.30 0.52 
Brazil -2.18 -1.89 -1.86 1.23 -0.30 -0.95 
India 0.56 -0.25 -2.34 1.53 -0.30 0.86 
Mexico -2.21 -0.40 -0.85 0.56 -0.30 0.20 
Korea 1.75 1.44 0.67 1.20 -0.30 -0.12 
Indonesia 4.14 0.77 -1.54 0.23 -0.30 2.39 
Argentina 2.67 -0.50 -0.48 1.03 -0.30 -0.75 
Thailand 4.77 -0.65 0.09 1.03 -0.30 -1.47 
Colombia -0.72 -1.04 -2.31 1.69 -0.30 -0.12 
Malaysia 9.21 2.07 -3.94 1.03 -0.30 5.28 
Chile -1.18 -4.40 -0.99 0.34 -0.30 -3.44 
Philippines -1.35 -2.20 -3.99 0.89 -0.30 1.21 
Note: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Source: author’s calculations. 
  
20 
5. Conclusion 
 
Global imbalances are a threat to the global macroeconomic stability. Therefore identify the 
main causes and drivers of these imbalances seem to be crucial. The objective of this paper 
was to investigate if financial openness has played a major role in the evolution of global 
imbalances on the period 1980-2003. 
 
The main finding is that the relative financial openness (measured as the deviation relatively 
to world average) has played significant role on the magnitude of medium run current 
account. By increasing the opportunities of overseas investments, the relative financial 
openness has had positive impact on medium run current account of industrialized countries 
(because of downward pressures on domestic investment rates). Conversely, the relative 
financial openness has had negative impact on medium run current account of emerging 
countries (because of upward pressures on domestic investment rates). For a number of 
industrialized countries, the relative financial openness has had a negative impact on medium 
run current account. For South-East Asian countries, the relative financial openness has had 
a positive impact on medium run current account. The evolution of domestic and foreign 
financial openness has allowed increasing the medium run current account in absolute value. 
 
In the recent debate on the ceiling of the current account surplus (The Economist, 2010), 
many observers have raised questions on how quantify the threshold from which world 
macroeconomic stability is assured. We argue that financial openness should be taken in 
account in these kinds of calculations. The evolution of domestic and foreign financial 
openness has allowed increasing the medium run current account in absolute value during the 
period 1980-2003. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1.1: Sources of the data 
 
Variable Description Unit Source 
CA 
Current account is all transactions other than 
those in financial and capital items. The major 
classifications are goods and services, income 
and current transfers. The focus of the BOP is 
on transactions (between an economy and the 
rest of the world) in goods, services, and income. 
Percent of GDP 
World Economic Outlook, IMF, 
April 2010 
GFA The sum of foreign asset and foreign liabillities. Percent of GDP 
P.R. Lane and G.M. Milesi-
Ferretti’s Database, 2007 
INV 
Gross capital formation (formerly gross domestic 
investment) consists of outlays on additions to 
the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes 
in the level of inventories. Fixed assets include 
land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and 
so on); plant, machinery, and equipment 
purchases; and the construction of roads, 
railways, and the like, including schools, offices, 
hospitals, private residential dwellings, and 
commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories 
are stocks of goods held by firms to meet 
temporary or unexpected fluctuations in 
production or sales, and "work in progress." 
According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of 
valuables are also considered capital formation. 
Percent of GDP 
World Developpment Indicators, 
2009 
KAOPEN 
The first standardized principal component of 
k1t, k2t, SHAREk3t, k4t  
(See appendix 5). 
 Chinn-Ito index, 2006 
OG 
The output gap is measured as the percentage 
difference between actual GDP in constant 
prices, and estimated potential GDP. The latter 
is estimated using a production function 
approach with the exact specification varying 
across countries depending on data availability. 
For most countries potential output is estimated 
using data on capital services, total factor 
productivity and potential employment which in 
part depends on estimates of the structural rate 
of unemployment (NAIRU). (Except for 
emerging countries, see note 11). 
Percentage difference 
between actual GDP in 
constant prices, and 
estimated potential GDP 
Economic Outlook, OECD, May 
2010 
22 
Variable Description Unit Source 
PG 
Annual population growth rate for year t is the 
exponential rate of growth of midyear 
population from year t-1 to t, expressed as a 
percentage. Population is based on the de facto 
definition of population, which counts all 
residents regardless of legal status or citizenship-
-except for refugees not permanently settled in 
the country of asylum, which are generally 
considered part of the population of the country 
of origin. 
Percent of total population 
World Developpment Indicators, 
2009 
Note: The independent variables are expressed relatively to their weighted world average in all regressions. The 
weights are the share in the world GDP in PPP terms (source: World Economic Outlook, IMF, April 2010). 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table A2.1: Determinants of the current account with Panel GMM for industrialized 
countries and emerging countries 
 
 
Panel GMM  
(Industrialized Countries) 
Panel GMM 
(Emerging Countries) 
CA(-1) 
0.45*** 
(0.03) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
RPG 
-2.55*** 
(0.53) 
-2.0812% 
(1.31) 
ROG 
-0.61*** 
(0.04) 
-0.19* 
(0.10) 
RKAOPEN 
0.84*** 
(0.17) 
-0.81*** 
(0.21) 
Significant time dummies 92-95, 96-99, 00-03 96-99, 00-03 
Number of Observations 72 84 
J-statistic 
11.95 
[0.21] 
5.22 
[0.81] 
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. The last row show 
the J-statistic is the Sargan statistic for the validity of over-identifying restrictions. P-values are reported in 
square brackets. Source: author’s estimates. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Table A3.1: Linear correlation between current account and relative financial openness for 
industrialized countries 
 
 
(Source: author’s calculations) 
 
Table A3.2: Linear correlation between current account and relative financial openness for 
emerging countries 
 
 
(Source: author’s calculations) 
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Appendix 4 
 
Table A4.1: Determinants of the current account with a de facto measure of financial 
openness for industrialized countries 
 
 OLS Pooled 
OLS Individual  
Fixed Effects 
Constant 
-2.03*** 
(0.13) 
-0.96*** 
(0.23) 
RPG 
-2.57*** 
(0.52) 
-0.89** 
(0.39) 
ROG 
-0.56** 
(0.17) 
-0.55*** 
(0.11) 
ΔRGFA 
0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.007*** 
(0.00) 
Adjusted R squared 0.43 0.92 
Number of Observations 90 90 
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Source: author’s 
estimates. 
 
Table A4.2: Determinants of the current account with a de facto measure of financial 
openness for emerging countries 
 
 OLS Pooled 
OLS Individual  
Fixed Effects 
Constant 
-0.67 
(0.48) 
-0.71** 
(0.34) 
RPG 
-1.20*** 
(0.46) 
-1.53*** 
(0.38) 
ROG 
-0.43*** 
(0.11) 
-0.34*** 
(0.05) 
ΔRGFA 
-0.02** 
(0.00) 
-0.02*** 
(0.00) 
Adjusted R squared 0.23 0.70 
Number of Observations 105 105 
Notes: The independent and dependent variables are non-overlapping 4-year averages of the corresponding annual 
variables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The symbols *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Source: author’s 
estimates. 
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Appendix 5 
 
The KAOPEN index is a measure of financial openness (i.e. openness of the capital account). 
Introduced for the first time by Chinn and Ito in 2002, this index aims to measure the 
extensity of the capital controls (as it is an inverse measure of the intensity of capital 
controls) based on the information of the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAR). 
 
The KAOPEN index is computed from binary dummy variables. These dummy variables are 
used to codify the restrictions on cross border financial transaction reported in the AREAR. 
Until 1996, the AREAR assign dummy variables for the four major categories on the 
restriction on the capital account (the existence of multiple exchange rates (k1), restrictions 
on current account transactions (k2), restrictions on capital account transactions (k3) and 
requirement of the surrender of export proceeds (k4)). In order to understand the complexity 
of capital control policies, these four categories have been more disaggregated in 1996 (the 
variables indicating restrictions on current account transactions have been divided into 
thirteen categories). 
 
Since they are focused on the effect of financial openness, Chinn and Ito reverse these binary 
variables. When variables are equal to zero, the capital account restrictions exist. In addition 
for the k3 category, they used a five-year window where capital controls where not in effect 
(SHAREk3). 
 
 
 
 
3,t 3,t-1 3,t-2 3,t-3 3,t-4
3,t
k +k +k +k +k
SHAREk =
5
 
 
Then, they construct their index for capital account ‘openness’, which the first standardized 
principal component of k1t, k2t, SHAREk3t, k4t (Chinn and Ito, 2007). The more the country is 
open to cross-border capital flows, the more the KAOPEN index is high. This index has the 
merit to try to measure the intensity of capital restriction. The index was firstly designed to 
measure the extensity of capital controls, but as it incorporates various kinds of restrictions it 
may be a good proxy to gauge the intensity of capital account restrictions. Note that the 
KAOPEN index is highly correlated with other measures of financial openness (Chinn and 
Ito, 2007). 
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Figure A5.1: Relative KAOPEN for Industrialized Countries 
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(Source: author’s calculations) 
 
For a number of industrialized countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Germany, Japan), the RKAOPEN variable follows a negative trend since the beginning of 
the 1980’s. The RKAOPEN variable describes the magnitude of capital openness relative to 
global average (which corresponds to a weighted average of the KAOPEN index (Chinn & 
Ito, 2002, 2006). The weights are equal to the share of each country in world GDP in PPP 
terms. More precisely, RKAOPEN = KAOPEN -KAOPEN ). 
 
Since the global average follows a positive trend since the mid-1980 and that many 
industrialized countries have already liberalized their capital account in early 1980’s, the 
relative capital openness variable (RKAOPEN) dropped in these countries. These evolutions 
have contributed negatively to the current account since the estimated coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant for the industrialized countries’ panel in all regressions. 
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Figure A5.2: Relative KAOPEN for Emerging Countries 
 
  
  
  
-3,5
-3,0
-2,5
-2,0
-1,5
-1,0
-0,5
0,0
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
China  
Relative KAOPEN
-4,0
-3,5
-3,0
-2,5
-2,0
-1,5
-1,0
-0,5
0,0
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
Brazil  
Relative KAOPEN
-3,0
-2,5
-2,0
-1,5
-1,0
-0,5
0,0
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
India 
Relative KAOPEN
-4,0
-3,0
-2,0
-1,0
0,0
1,0
2,0
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
Mexico  
Relative KAOPEN
-3,0
-2,5
-2,0
-1,5
-1,0
-0,5
0,0
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
Korea 
Relative KAOPEN
-1,0
-0,5
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
Indonesia 
Relative KAOPEN
30 
 
  
  
  
(Source: author’s calculations) 
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For a number of emerging countries (China, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia), the RKAOPEN 
variable follows a negative trend since the beginning of the 1980’s. The RKAOPEN variable 
describes the magnitude of capital account openness relatively to global average (which 
corresponds to a weighted average of the KAOPEN index (Chinn & Ito, 2002, 2006). The 
weights are equal to the share of each country in world GDP in PPP terms. More precisely, 
RKAOPEN = KAOPEN -KAOPEN ). 
 
For these countries, the drop of the relative capital openness (RKAOPEN) variable means 
that they liberalized their capital account more slowly than the global average. These 
evolutions have contributed positively to the current account since the estimated coefficient 
is negative and statistically significant for the emerging countries’ panel in all regressions. 
 
  
32 
References 
 
Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, Review of Economic Studies, 58, pp. 
277-297. 
 
Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of 
Error-Components Models, Journal of Econometrics, 68, pp. 29-51. 
 
Baltagi, B.H., Demetriades, P.O., Law, S.H., 2009. Financial development and openness: 
Evidence from panel data, Journal of Development Economics, 89, pp. 285-296. 
 
Bernanke, B., 2005. The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current Account. Remarks at the 
Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association of Economics, Richmond, VA, March 10. 
 
Carmignani, F., 2008. Does capital account liberalisation promote economic growth? 
Evidence from system estimation, Economics Bulletin, 6(49), pp. 1-13. 
 
Chinn, M.D., 2010. Evidence on Financial Globalization and Crises: Global Imbalances, In: 
Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization (eds Caprio, G. et al.). 
 
Chinn, M.D., Ito, H., 2002. Capital account liberalization, institutions and financial 
development: cross country evidence, Working Paper No. 8967, NBER. 
 
Chinn, M.D., Ito, H., 2006. What matters for financial development? Capital controls, 
institutions, and interactions, Journal of Development Economics, 81, pp. 163-192. 
 
Chinn, M.D., Ito, H., 2007. Current account balances, financial development and institutions: 
Assaying the world ‘‘saving glut’’, Journal of International Money and Finance, 26, pp. 546-
569. 
 
Chinn, M.D., Ito, H., 2008. Global Current Account Imbalances: American Fiscal Policy 
versus East Asian Savings, Review of International Economics, 16, pp. 479-498. 
 
Chinn, M.D., Ito, H., 2008. A New Measure of Financial Openness, Journal of Comparative 
Policy Analysis, 10, pp. 309-322. 
33 
Chinn, M.D., Prasad, E.S., 2003. Medium term determinants of current accounts in industrial 
and develloping countries: an empirical exploration, Journal of International Economics, 59, 
pp. 47-76. 
 
Clarida, R., 2005a. Japan, China, and the U.S. Current Account Deficit, CATO Journal 25, 
pp. 111-114. 
 
Clarida, R., 2005b. Some Thoughts on ‘The Sustainability and Adjustment of Global Current 
Account Imbalances’. Speech given at the Council on Foreign Relations, March 28. 
 
Cline, W. R., 2010. Renminbi Undervaluation, China's Surplus, and the US Trade Deficit, 
Policy Brief 10-20, Peterson Institute for International Economics. 
 
Dooley, M., Folkerts-Landau, D., Garber, P., 2003. An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods 
System, NBER Working Paper 9971, NBER. 
 
Dooley, M., Folkerts-Landau, D., Garber, P., 2008. Direct Investment, Rising Real Wages, 
and the Absorption of Excess Labor in the Periphery, in R. Clarida (Eds.), G-7 Current 
Account Imbalances: Sustainability and Adjustment, University of Chicago Press for NBER. 
 
Eichengreen, B., 2001. Capital Account Liberalization: What Do Cross-Country Studies Tell 
Us?, World Bank Economic Review, 15, pp. 341-365. 
 
Faruqee, H., Isard, P. (Eds), 1998. Exchange rate assessment: Extensions to the 
macroeconomic balance approach, IMF Occasional Paper 167, International Monetary Fund. 
 
Ito, H., Chinn, M.D., 2007. East Asia and Global Imbalances: Saving, Investment, and 
Financial Development, NBER Working Paper 13364, NBER. 
 
Jeong, S.-E., Mazier, J., 2003. Exchange rate regimes and equilibrium exchange rates in East 
Asia, Revue économique, 54, pp. 1161-1182. 
 
Jeong, S.-E., Mazier, J., Saadaoui, J., 2010. Exchange rate misalignments at world and 
European level: a FEER approach, Économie Internationale / International Economics, 121, 
pp. 25-58. 
 
Kose, M.A., Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., Wei, S. J., 2006. Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal. 
NBER Working Paper No. 12484, NBER. 
34 
Lee, J., Milesi-Ferreti, G.M., Ostry, J.D., Prati, A., Ricci, L.A., 2008. Exchange rate 
assessments: CGER methodologies, IMF Occasional Papers 261, International Monetary 
Fund. 
 
Quinn, D.P., Toyoda, A.M., 2008. Does Capital Account Liberalization Lead to Growth?, 
Review of Financial Studies, 21(3), pp. 1403-1449. 
 
Servén, L., Nguyen, H., 2010. Global Imbalances Before and After the Global Crisis, Policy 
Research Working Paper 5354, The World Bank. 
 
The Economist, ‘Finally, a talking-shop worth having’, November 4, 2010. 
 
